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n Naming and Necessity, Kripke criticizes the denotative theory 
of reference and proposes a version of the causal theory of ref-
erence. The outline of the discussion between these two theo-
ries is the following: the denotative theory is advocated by Rus-
sell, who thinks that the reference of a name is determined by 
the definite description the name gives. Kripke, however, opposes this 
idea; he thinks that names can designate objects without description, 
and proposes his version of the causal theory. In this paper, I attempt to 
examine the criticism given by Kripke and defend the denotative theory 
from it. I then challenge the causal theory. Finally, I will show the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the denotative theory and the causal 
theory, along with a comparison between the two. To achieve this goal, 
it is first necessary to explain the denotative theory, the foundation of 
which is the notion of definite descriptions, before moving to an expla-
nation of Kripke's version of the causal theory, the foundation of which 
is the notion of rigid designators.  
 
I. Description Theory and Denotative Theory 
In this section, I will explain what the description theory is, 
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which is advocated by Russell. The main idea presented by this theory 
is that reference is determined by descriptions. Firstly, then, the notion 
of descriptions needs to be explained. Russell divides our knowledge 
into two categories: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description. The former is given by direct cognition, and involves no 
inferences. The objects of this knowledge are sense-data, universals, 
awareness of objects, and relations.1 Knowledge by description, on the 
other hand, is given by definite descriptions. Descriptions are repre-
sented in the phrases “a so-and-so” and “the so-and-so,” the former of 
which is called an indefinite description, and the latter of which is 
called a definite description. The objects of knowledge by description 
are physical objects and other minds.2 What play a central role in the 
theory of description are singular definite descriptions. Russell thinks 
that all names are descriptions; proper names are definite descriptions.  
Therefore, a proper name refers to an object, when the definite descrip-
tion given by the name determines one and only one object that is the 
so-and-so.  
Russell also proposes the denotative theory of meaning, which 
asserts that the meaning of a word is the object it denotes. Then, in Rus-
sell's view, names have meanings, since they are definite descriptions 
which denote objects. Moreover, names have intensions as well as ex-
tensions.3 Here, the intension of a word is the set of properties the word 
represents; and the extension of a word is the set of objects to which the 
word is applied. It seems necessary at this point to make some remarks 
for the sake of clarity. Russell, like Frege, distinguishes sense and 
meaning. Names have both sense (intension) and meaning (extension), 
the former of which is the definite descriptions they represent, and the 
latter of which is the object the definite descriptions denote, which 
serves as the referent of the name. 
In the case of Hesperus, the name “Hesperus” is a definite de-
scription representing the certain properties such as “it is a planet seen 
at such and such place in the celestial sphere in such and such period of 
time in evening.” These properties determine one and only one object, 
namely Venus, which is the meaning of the name “Hesperus”. Hence 
the proper name “Hesperus” refers to the referent Hesperus, which 
satisfies the definite description. Kripke, however, makes an objection 
against this theory of description,  which I will now turn to. 
 
II. An Objection by Kripke and the Causal Theory 




especially those of natural stuffs, in fact have no intensions.4 His refuta-
tion of the theory of description goes as follows. Objects referred by the 
same name can have different (accidental) properties in different possi-
ble worlds. In other words, one name can have different descriptions in 
different possible worlds; thus names cannot determine their unique 
descriptions. For instance, Hesperus in a possible world can be located 
at different place in space than it is in the actual world. Nevertheless, 
the heavenly body would still be Hesperus.   
Kripke also points out the problem of identity between differ-
ent names in the denotative theory of meaning. There are cases in 
which two different names refer to the same object, such as Hesperus 
and Phosphorus both referring to the object Venus. Hence the identity 
holds between Hesperus and Phosphorus. However, this will not do in 
the denotative theory of meaning, because the intensions of these 
names are different from each other.5 That is, a part of the sense of 
“Hesperus” is “an evening star”, while that of “Phosphorus” is “a 
morning star”. Thus, there is a problem with replacing names with de-
scriptions as Russel would have us do. That is, although Hesperus and 
Phosphorus name the same object, we utilize different sentences to de-
note them—in this case by referencing the times of day in which we 
encounter them. 
To avoid these problems, Kripke thinks that names are rigid 
designators rather than descriptions. Rigid designators are terms that 
refer to the same individual in every possible world where the individ-
ual exists. To see how the notion of rigid designator solves these prob-
lems, I will explain how Kripke establishes the identity between Hes-
perus and Phosphorus. He regards this identity as a posteriori neces-
sary. That is, the proposition that Hesperus is identical with Phospho-
rus cannot be false, and cannot be found to be true without empirical 
investigation. The a posteriority of the identity is evident because it 
seems impossible to know the identity without astronomical observa-
tion, and because the words “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” did not 
originally have as the explicit referent Venus. Ancient people did not 
know Hesperus and Phosphorus are in fact Venus and thought that 
they are different heavenly bodies; thus the names “Hesperus” and 
“Phosphorus” in the ancient use did not refer to the Venus. However, 
the necessity of the identity requires an explanation, because it seems 
possible for the identity to fail to hold. Here, however, rigid designa-
tors assure the necessity of identity. In the case of Hesperus and Phos-
phorus, both names rigidly designate the same object, Venus, in every 
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possible world where Venus exists. Since the identity holds in every 
possible world, it is necessary.  
On the basis of rigid designators, Kripke establishes his version 
of the causal theory of reference, which states that what links names 
with referents is a causal chain, and in his version is rigid designator. 
The sketch of the causal chain of reference is shown as follows: firstly, 
Kripke says that, in order for a name to refer to objects, the speaker of 
the word must intend to do so. Then the speaker’s intention is main-
tained through language communication, thereby a name refers to the 
same objects in the practice.6 For instance, let us consider the name of a 
man, say, John. When he was born, his parents named him John in the 
initial baptism. In this step, the name “John” gains its referent. Then his 
parents talk about John to other people, or John himself says “My name 
is John” when he introduces himself. In these instances people learn the 
referent of the name “John”. In suchways the name “John” spreads 
through communications, preserving its referent. Thus names can refer 
to its refferent without definite descriptions.  
 
III. Consideration of the Debate between the Denotative and Causal 
Theories 
In this section, I will consider the advantages and disad-
vantages of the denotative and causal theories. The above discussion of 
Kripke, presented some of the disadvantages of the denotative theory; 
the difference of intensions of names in different possible worlds can-
not explain the trans-world identity between objects referred by the 
same name, and the identity between different names referring to the 
same extension fails. Accordingly, denotative theory has difficulty han-
dling identity relations. If Kripke is correct in these points, denotative 
theory would be fatally damaged, because the fundamental notion of 
description is ineffective. Unfortunately, his arguments seem plausible.  
Should then we abandon the denotative theory and accept the 
causal theory? My answer is no; the denotative theory surely has an 
advantage over the causal theory in the clarity of the referential relation 
between names and referents. In denotative theory, names and refer-
ents are closely linked by the relation of description. A name refers to 
object if the object satisfies the definite description given by the name. 
Kripke thinks that names do not give descriptions, because different 
descriptions are attributed to the same name in different possible 
worlds. However, I oppose this view, because the consideration of de-




When we concentrate on the determination of the referent of a name in 
the actual world, we can do without the consideration of other possible 
worlds. For example, when we use the name “Hesperus” this name 
gives us only one definite description, that is, “it is a planet seen at 
such and such place in the celestial sphere in such and such period of 
time in evening.” The referent of the name “Hesperus” can be clearly 
determined by the definite description given by the name (even though 
restricted in the actual world). The extension of a name is thus clearly 
determined in terms of its intension. Despite of the problem of identity, 
the denotative theory explains more about reference than the causal 
theory and is thus preferable.  
In the causal theory, on the other hand, the relation between 
names and referents is unclear. In other words, it is unclear how rigid 
designators can rigidly designate referents without description or in-
tension. Rigid designators, in Kripke's explanation, designate the same 
object in every possible world where it exists. However, in the case of 
Hesperus in a possible world where it is located in a different place 
than in the actual world, how can we determine the referent of 
“Hesperus” without the definite description of it? Moreover, how can 
we say that the heavenly body in the possible world is Hesperus?  
Kripke's answer with the speaker's intention is unsatisfactory, because 
the referents of a name can change through the advancement of time. 
Thus, the speaker's intention of the use of a name cannot be retained. 
Therefore it seems impossible for extension of a name to be determined 
without its intention.  
Kripke’s argument that names do not have senses or intensions 
is problematic as well. While the example of the determination of the 
referent of the name “John” seems successful, in the case of the referent 
of “Hesperus”, the causal-theoretical explanation seems to fail. If the 
explanation is applied to that case, the scenario would be the following. 
In the first place, an ancient astronomer named an evening star Hesper-
us. Then through communication, the use of the name “Hesperus” 
spread. After a while, however, it was discovered that Hesperus is in 
fact the planet Venus. At this point, people would have thought that 
the name “Hesperus” got some alternation. In Kripke’s view, names 
have no intensions, but only extensions. In this case, however, the ex-
tension of the name “Hesperus” remains the same. Thus it seems inevi-
table  to  think  that  what  got  the  alternation  is  the  intension  of 
“Hesperus”, and names indeed have intensions. 
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IV. Conclusion 
This paper has presented the debate between the denotative 
theory and Kripke's version of the causal theory. The crucial point of 
this debate is whether names are descriptions or rigid designators. As a 
result of our analysis, we can say that the advantage of the denotative 
theory is the clarity of the referential relation between names and refer-
ents, whereas its disadvantage is its difficulty in treating identity rela-
tions. On the other hand, the advantage of Kripke's causal theory is the 
preservation of identity between names; whereas its disadvantage is its 
difficulty in explaining reference without the intention of names.  
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